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expected 2023, Joe Stroud, In Good Faith Foundation (Australia); Clare Leaney, In
Good Faith Foundation (Australia) and Hannah Aroni, In Good Faith Foundation for the
extraordinary teamwork, dedication, and commitment that marked our remarkable
collaborative process.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Sex abuse, particularly of children, is a crime which any rational person would
wish to prevent. However, when an individual’s loyalties and responsibilities to an
institution put them at odds with preventing sex abuse, it is far too often the institution
which takes precedence. This is the grim phenomenon of institutional complicity. It is a
plague which, sadly, permeates institutions of all types, be it a school, hospital, sports
team, church, military, or government agency. It also permeates countries as a global
issue.
I have interviewed dozens of survivors who suffered under an abuser who was
protected by an institution. The survivor’s expectation of the institution is simple: to be
protected. Yet, time after time, these survivors found that it was the good name and
reputation of the institution which was protected rather than themselves. Many survivors
express that their anger towards those who enabled the abuse is greater than their
anger towards the abuser.
In this submission I propose that the answer is to criminalize the enabler. By
enabler, I mean an individual who knows that sex abuse is occurring and yet fails to
inform the appropriate law enforcement agency. I have come to the conclusion that the
harm caused by sexual assault enablers does rise to the level of criminality. The harm
inflicted by the enabler’s deliberate choice to abandon those in their power to protect is
a plague which should be addressed by every government.
To that end, I make the following recommendations. I invite this committee to
ensure a law exists which does the following:
• Criminalizes those who know sex abuse is occurring but fail to report to law
enforcement
• Extends to all persons, regardless of their relationship to the victim
• Ensures that protecting an institution is not a valid defense
• Requires immediate reporting
• Is broad enough to protect anyone vulnerable to sex abuse, be they child or adult
• Applies whenever the abuser presents a continuous threat to future victims
• Provides reasonable exceptions and protections, particularly if the reporter is
themselves in danger of abuse
• Is known and understood by law enforcement and prosecutors
• Is known and understood by the public
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PERSONAL INTRODUCTION
I am a Professor of Law at the S.J. Quinney College of Law, University of Utah. I
am the inaugural Chair of the University of Utah Independent Review Committee
(Presidential appointment), mandated to review safety and security measures,
decisions, and actions by the University’s Public Safety Department. I was elected to
the University of Utah’s Academic Senate Executive Committee.
Relevant to my testimony, my academic writings include The Central Role of
Enablers and Bystanders in Athlete Abuse: Applying a Legal Framework to the Culture
of Complicity in Sport (co-authored. International Sports Law Journal, forthcoming);
Armies of Enablers: Complicity and Betrayal in Sexual Assaults, (American Bar
Association, 2020); Failing to Protect the Vulnerable: The Dangers of Institutional
Complicity and Enablers (University of Illinois Law Review, forthcoming 2022); The
Crime of Complicity: The Bystander in the Holocaust (American Bar Association);
Bystander Legislation: He Ain’t Heavy, He’s My Brother, (co-authored, Kansas Journal
Law and Policy, 2020).
I have testified both before the State of Utah House of Representatives regarding
criminalizing the bystander and the Dutch National Rapporteur regarding sexual
exploitation of children. This past March, Governor Spencer Cox signed Utah H.B. 182
regarding mandatory reporting and the bystander to which my research contributed.
Furthermore, I have worked with elected officials in other states regarding the
criminalization of bystanders and enablers.
I have spoken at Webinars hosted in the U.K., South Africa, Australia, and the
U.S. on issues pertinent to this testimony. In addition, I have been invited to testify as an
expert witness regarding institutional complicity, bystanders, and enablers.1 2

I. INTRODUCTION
Madam Chair, Members of this Distinguished Committee; it is a great honor
to be invited to speak before you today on the topic at hand. I can but hope my
submitted testimony sheds light on an issue that has sadly gone unobserved or
disregarded for far too long. As I have come to learn, and as explicated below, the
power of the enabler and the consequences of their actions demand our urgent
attention. While criminalizing omission causes discomfort in many quarters, the time
has come for us to put that traditional hesitation aside.
We need to recognize that the decision not to act when there is knowledge of
harm to another cannot be tolerated. The harm this causes to the person in peril is
significant, sometimes very significant, and sometimes fatal. We are at a crossroads
on this issue. As I have come to learn, and as I note below, the omission of the
enabler is frankly no less impactful than the commission of the perpetrator. The
1
2
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distinction between commission and omission must not be understood as justifying
or overlooking the enabler, as if their decision towards inaction did not cause any
harm.
It is for that reason, Madam Chairwoman and Members of this Committee,
that I warmly applaud your decision to hold this hearing. It is my fervent hope that
this will result in much needed legislation both in Victoria and in other states in
Australia. It would be my great honor to participate in a legislative process whereby
Australia takes the lead worldwide and is so recognized and acknowledged. The
fact that we have allowed the enabler to escape the law has had dire consequences
for survivors. They bear the brunt of our collective failure to criminalize the individual
who had knowledge and yet chose to do nothing. This hearing, and hopefully
pursuant legislation, is a welcome undertaking from the perspective of many
survivors. It is their voices that need to guide our discussion.
In that spirit, my testimony will be divided into the following sections: I:
Introduction; II: Interviewing Survivors; III: Philosophy of Omissions; IV: Enablers; V:
Criminalizing the Enabler; VI: A Path Forward.
Criminal liability has typically been reserved for those who have both actus
reus and mens rea. Liability for true omissions is infrequent in modern criminal
codes and even less frequently enforced. Despite wide public support for aiding
those in peril, Western democracies have historically refused to impose any penalty
upon those who fail to aid someone in danger.
However, recent high profile abuse scandals, including those of the USA
gymnastics team, University of Michigan and the Catholic Church, have caused
scholars and policymakers to rethink these assumptions. In recent years, some
jurisdictions have slowly come to criminalize those who witness another in peril and
fail to provide aid. Unfortunately, most governments have remained silent on
whether to punish actors not present, but who learn of the endangerment of the
victim and squander their unique ability to protect them. Indeed, unlike other threats
to society, current legislation does not effectively criminalize these enablers of
crime.
The enabler is defined as follows: an individual who knows, or should know,
that another individual has been harmed and makes the decision to not act to either
minimize harm to that individual and/or to other potential victims. The enabler is not
present when the harm is caused but fails to act when information regarding the
harm is brought to their attention. The enabler has the power to protect the victim,
but nevertheless chooses not to act on their behalf. While not physically present
when harm occurs, obligation and liability should not be viewed differently because
of the knowledge requirement which is an essential element of the definition.
Criminalizing omission, whilst the source of discomfort—legal and
legislative—is an essential step in directly addressing abuse. Examining the issue
from the perspective of the person in peril provides a path towards more effectively
redressing the harms suffered by crime victims. We need to punish enablers who
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protect the perpetrator. Doing so requires recognizing that two crimes often occur
simultaneously, almost symbiotically: the actor’s crime of commission and the
enabler’s crime of omission. Until we recognize the power of the crime of omission,
survivors will confront perpetrators who are protected by enablers. The time has
come to say, “enough is enough.”
To that end, my testimony proposes criminalizing omission as an essential
tool in that critical effort. It does not focus on the actions of the perpetrator. That I
leave to others. Rather, I focus on the actor whose omission enables the
perpetrator. That actor is the enabler: the person who knew or should have known
of the perpetrators conduct.

II. INTERVIEWING SURVIVORS
My perspective on enablers is greatly impacted and shaped by interviews I have
conducted with sexual assault survivors. While I am not, under any condition, their
spokesman, I do allow myself the privilege of speaking on their behalf regarding the
harm enablers caused them. Over the course of the past three years, I have interviewed
sexual assault survivors from USA Gymnastics, Michigan State University, The Ohio
State University, the Catholic Church, and the University of Michigan. In addition, I have
communicated with parents whose children were sexually assaulted and murdered.
I came to learn from survivors that there are direct ramifications emanating from
the inaction of enablers. I wish to share with the committee but a few examples:
Mattie Larson was an elite Olympic level gymnast, competing under the auspices
of USA Gymnastics. Ms. Larson is a survivor of the horrific crimes of USAG and
Michigan State University Doctor Larry Nassar who was convicted in 2017 and
sentenced to over 60 years in prison. Ms. Larson was sexually assaulted by Nassar on
750 different occasions. When I asked Ms. Larson what her expectations were of USAG
officials, her answer was concise: “to be protected.” When I asked Ms. Larson about the
consequences of the enablers failure to protect her, the answer was similarly concise: “I
was abandoned.”
Jade Lewis, a star tennis player at Louisiana State University, was sexually
assaulted and brutalized by her boyfriend Drake Davis, at football player also at LSU
When Ms. Lewis reported the assault to her coaches, she was rebuffed and dismissed.
As these lines are written, LSU has been sued by multiple parties, including Ms. Lewis.
An independent report has clearly articulated an enabling culture at LSU that placed
vulnerable student athletes at peril.
Lauren McCluskey was a student-athlete at the University of Utah. Ms.
McCluskey was murdered in October 2018 on the University campus by a non-student
with whom she had had a previous relationship. Prior to the murder, Lauren, her friends,
and teammates had shared their deep worries regarding this individual, and the danger
he posed, with student housing and campus police officials who did not act on the
warnings. In the aftermath of a settlement between the University and Lauren’s parents,
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a Foundation has been established to address many of the issues relevant to my
testimony (the decision to create an Independent Review Committee—which I Chair as
noted above—was one of the “lessons learned” from Lauren’s murder).
I respectfully request the Committee recall Ms. Larson, Ms. Lewis, and Ms.
McCluskey in the discussion and also note these are but a few examples. Sadly, as I
have come to learn, it would be impossible to share all such stories with the Committee
as they are endless and continuing.
It is sadly unnecessary to point out that this abuse transcends boundaries. This
trauma and victimization of people is universal, which is what brings me before you
today. Lest you need convincing of this universality, I offer you another three examples
of the crime of omission, all taking place here in Victoria. These examples are offered
with the caveat that I have not personally interviewed these survivors.
There has been previous discussion of the scandals within the Catholic Church,
not localized to the United States: Cardinal Pell is an example that I am aware hits
home here in Victoria. Pell fostered an environment of enabling child molestation here in
Melbourne, not unlike his predecessor Frank Little, former Archbishop of Melbourne.
When parents approached Little about their children being assaulted by Father Frank
Vears (now Russel Walker), he concealed the crime for 30 years. Vears confronted the
mother after mass and continued to assault the boy during this time. Little responded by
simply relocating him to another parish. Another man under his purview, Father
Searson, was known to abuse boys and show them dead bodies. When concerns were
made known to Little, he either dismissed the parents or encouraged them to speak
directly to Searson. Pell and Little both resonate darkly with my experience working with
survivors of Cardinal Law here in the United States. Like his Australian counterparts,
Law relocated and “rehabilitated” known offenders rather than protect the innocent child
victims.
But just as these crimes are not confined by boundary, neither are they
encapsulated by religion. Perhaps a perfect example of this transcendence of these
communities is Malka Leifer. Malka Leifer, a former teacher and principal of
Melbourne’s Adass Israel School in Melbourne, faces 74 counts of sexually abusing
children during her position at the school. Leifer, the perpetrator, was enabled by many
people, but I’ll point to just one enabler: former Deputy of Health Minister of Israel
Yaakov Litzman. Leifer, an Israeli-Australian dual citizen, fled to Israel in 2008 after her
former students came forward with allegations. Litzman is said to have pressured
psychiatrists to proclaim Leifer as mentally unfit to be tried for her crimes. Litzman
actively sought to create an environment of protection around Leifer, thus shielding her
from the responsibilities of her crimes. He omitted his duty to yield her to due process
and justice. Israel will indict Litzman contingent on a hearing.
Finally, the Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual
Abuse is a well-known body here in Australia, and many of their 57 case studies point to
tragedies in Victoria. The Melbourne Response, Australian Christian Churches, the
Yeshiva College in Melbourne, the Royal Children’s Hospital in Victoria, Geelong

6
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3866918

Grammar School, and several youth detention centers are all named. In each of these
examples, children, and occasionally their parents, were either disbelieved or entirely
dismissed. Many children were in fact punished for coming forward with their
accusations.
I could continue to provide examples of the crime of omission concerning sexual
assault, from any country in the world, but we are not here to pander about the problem.
Rather, we are here to formulate a solution to the crime of omission. This is not to say
that there were no existing protections in these cases; in some of the examples, duty of
care principles were already instituted. This raises another question—not only of how to
criminalize the crime of omission—but also how to optimize the existing patchwork of
legislation. If people were effectively required to report sexual abuse, then Pell, Little,
Litzman, and the subjects of the case studies of the Royal Commission would not be
able to perpetuate the cycle of concealing and enabling abuse.
While these stories are important—for hearing survivors is essential—the more
pressing challenge facing this distinguished Committee specifically, and society
generally, is how to most compellingly and decisively address the scourge of the
enabler. Larry Nassar was able to assault Mattie and hundreds of others only because
of the decision of the enabler. The same is true in all of the examples listed above. Our
challenge is to prevent these stories from being repeated.

III. PHILOSOPHY OF OMISSIONS
The crime of omission is not a new concept; it has been recognized for millennia.
In one of his writings, the ancient Greek philosopher Plato suggested that prison or
banishment was an appropriate punishment for one who witnessed a crime but did
nothing to stop it. Likewise, the Roman scholar Cicero once wrote, “He who does not,
when he can, ward off or repel wrong is guilty of injustice . . . what is to be thought of
him who, so far from repelling, abets the wrong?”
It is unclear the full extent to which these suggestions were legislated anciently,
but there are some examples of codification. Ancient Roman law punished homicide
caused by failure to provide food to another or, for doctors, failure to finish a surgery.
Other punishable offenses included the failure of a soldier to protect their superiors and
the failure of certain family members to protect each other. Later, under Roman Catholic
canon law, St. Thomas Aquinas championed the idea that certain omissions could be a
greater sin than some commissions, and even stated, “non-action is a kind of action.”
Despite nearly universal support of the morality of those who aid another in
harm—religious and otherwise—as European jurisprudence matured, it quickly divorced
itself from the idea of punishing omissions. By the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
most European jurisdictions had distanced themselves from the idea of punishing
omissions.

7
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3866918

Nowhere was this more apparent than in England. English common law initially
refused to find liability for omissions. This position was ardently defended, even late into
the nineteenth century. For example, James Fitzjames Stephen once proposed the
following hypothetical: “a number of people who stand round a shallow pond in which a
child is drowning, and let it drown without taking the trouble to ascertain the depth of the
pond, are, no doubt, shameful cowards, but they can hardly be said to have killed the
child."
It was not until the very end of the nineteenth century that English courts began
to recognize some exceptions to this baseline rule. One of the first exceptions was
finding there to be a duty to act when one had voluntarily assumed the care of another.
Critically, that case was one of the first to articulate the oft-repeated assertion that “it
would not be correct to say that every moral obligation involves a legal duty; but every
legal duty is founded on a moral obligation.” The Crown Court subsequently carved out
more exceptions, creating a duty to act when one creates a harmful situation or where
there was a contractual duty to act. This viewpoint on the crime of omission has been
replicated in many Western jurisdictions, including America and Australia.
While crimes of commission are familiar and readily understood, the crime of
omission raises significant concerns. The failure to consistently incorporate crimes of
omission in criminal codes ensures those who could have acted to protect the person in
peril evade legal accountability. But some have argued causation should be the ultimate
guidance when it comes to defining which omissions should be criminalized.
The concept and spirit of criminalizing omission is not absent in current
Australian law or public support. Just earlier this year, Richard Pusey was sentenced to
10 months in prison for filming the death of four police officers after their injury in a car
accident without providing any assistance. Pusey did not create the harm suffered by
these officers, but the court recognized and punished the harm his inaction caused.
As favorable a result as that was, it was something of an anomaly. Pusey was
charged under outraging public decency. This is already a rare charge and has not
been used previously in terms of punishing some forms of omission. In spite of that, this
recent development shows that Australian courts are willing to entertain the idea of
criminalizing omissions. Moreover, public support for Pusey’s sentence has been
incredibly strong, with some even frustrated with the length of Pusey’s sentence, feeling
that it was not long enough. To a certain extent, this situation appears akin to the court
bending the interpretation of an existing law to address a public outrage.
Ultimately, the concept of criminalizing omission is not one which should cause
concern. In the context of bystander and enabler legislation, the only thing which is lost
is the autonomy to refrain from aiding an individual in serious distress. That autonomy
does not provide any cognizable benefit to society; indeed, it has caused lifelong agony
to untold thousands by protecting those who would turn a blind eye to abuse.
As we turn our attention to the question of consequences, it is incumbent to view
the matter exclusively through the lens of the person in peril.
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IV. ENABLERS
The enabler was not present at the time of peril but knew or should have known
and failed to act. Therefore, guilt can be attached to an actor not present when harm
occurs but who chooses not to provide assistance to the person in peril. The
consequence is that the perpetrator acts knowing those who could prevent the crime will
not do so. More egregious than that, the person in peril comes to recognize that
protection will not be offered by those positioned to do so. Absent a case where the
enabler would be in harm’s way, there is no justification that can withstand legislative,
prosecutorial, or judicial scrutiny.
Those instances must be understood to be outliers; in the overwhelming majority
of cases, harm would not have befallen enablers had they chosen to protect the
individual in peril. In those cases, were they able to compellingly demonstrate their
position of peril, criminal sanctions should not be imposed. Absent those unique
circumstances there is no justification—from the perspective of the person in peril—in
tolerating enabler inaction. While the enabler did not directly cause harm to the survivor,
their inaction indirectly caused harm; for that reason, omission, like commission, must
be criminalized.
With that, we turn our attention to the mechanism for criminalizing the enabler.
Failure to aggressively pursue this course ensures the existing lacuna goes
unaddressed and that harms caused by predators will repeat themselves.
However, before doing so we must pause and address the question of “carrot or
stick?” While I make the argument that criminalizing the enabler is needed both to deter
others and to punish the wrongdoer, others say this is a step too far, suggesting
education efforts are sufficient in addressing the enabler. That argument is premised on
the argument that criminalizing is “over-kill” and imposing a criminal record on an
enabler does not reflect the intent or spirit of the criminal law. The argument reflects
concern, perhaps justifiable, with unnecessarily “tagging” an individual as a criminal
when, so goes the argument, the act is one of omission.
The deterrence-punishment argument is at the core of criminal law jurisprudence
and philosophy. The discourse regarding the effectiveness and intent of deterrence and
punishment has been discussed widely. The discussion of whether to criminalize the
enabler depends on the perspective from which the question is posed. When viewed
from the perspective of the person in peril, the answer is obvious. That is the position
advocated in my testimony. However, when viewed from the perspective of the enabler
specifically, and broader society in general, alarm bells are raised regarding overreach.
The overreach argument suggests a more measured, perhaps moderate
approach to the dilemma. Advocates for this approach believe that legislative overreach
can have unintended consequences running the gamut from prosecutorial overreach to
law enforcement targeting of minority communities to misallocation of government
resources to exaggeration of the threat posed by enablers. The suggestion, then, is that
the problem is manageable and perhaps not as profound as I propose. Rejection of the
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criminalization proposal, reverting to a “carrot-education” paradigm ultimately fails to do
what is most essential: protect the vulnerable.
We should not be dismissive of efforts to educate. However, such efforts, were
they to be implemented, must be undertaken in conjunction with implementation of the
criminal process. It is “fool’s gold” to assume that educational efforts, regardless of their
sincerity and desire, can compel enablers to act on behalf of the survivors.

V. CRIMINALIZING THE ENABLER
Because our primary motivation is to create a mechanism protecting the
vulnerable from perpetrator and enabler alike, we present in this section a road map for
criminalizing the enabler. To view harm through the narrow lens of commission, rather
than through combination of omission and commission, benefits two actors: the
perpetrator (directly) and the enabler (indirectly); the former because they are
unencumbered in committing their crime, the latter because they will not be held
responsible for their decision.
Some may argue that existing legislation—particularly mandatory reporting
laws—are sufficient. There are many reasons why this is incorrect as explained in the
following sections. The first two sections are a discussion regarding American law, the
second regards Australia, and the final addresses arguments against enabler
criminalization generally. While I am, naturally, most familiar with American law, I
have—in preparation for my testimony—studied both Australian law and relevant
legislative history. There is no intent, under any condition, to suggest the primacy of an
American approach; there is, however, value in a comparative approach and analysis. I
respectfully request the discussion regarding U.S. law be read in that context.

A. Inadequacies of Mandatory Reporting Legislation
Every state in the U.S. has adopted some type of “duty to report” or mandatory
reporting law. Similar laws have been adopted in Australia, similarly titled “duty of care.”
These laws generally require an adult in some specified position to report child abuse to
law enforcement as soon as they suspect it is occurring. While mandatory reporting
laws are undeniably a step in the right direction, they all lack the necessary elements to
be truly effective. These elements will be considered in turn:

1. Who is required to report?
A few states extend liability for mandatory reporting to all individuals, regardless
of position or status. However, a majority of states enumerate those who may be held
liable to specific individuals and professions. The former is the preferable approach. Any
state which enumerates specific positions to be held liable will obviously fall short of
including a certain place where sexual assault occurs. Sexual assault can occur
anywhere and by anyone. Nowhere is exempt, and thus, no one should be exempt.
Failing to include all persons in a mandatory reporting statute ignores the—
unfortunate—omnipresence of sexual assault.
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2. Who is protected?
Almost every state restricts mandatory reporting protections to the assault of
children. Only a handful of outliers require reporting for all victims when rape and/or
abuse is suspected, and even then only medical practitioners are required to make such
a report. Aside from overlooking the tragic universality of assault and abuse, this also
ignores the well-acknowledged effects which sexual assault can have on an individual’s
ability to protect themselves. While the desire to protect the most vulnerable first is
understandable, such a restriction simply provides a window for enablers to disregard
abuse of adults. All states should extend reporting protections to all individuals.

3. When must a report be made?
Virtually every state requires immediate reporting to a law enforcement agency or
abuse hotline. A few states allow a buffer zone of several days before a report must be
made. Given the seriousness of abuse and the continuing danger to the victim,
immediate reporting is ideal.

4. What is the degree of criminality?
Degrees of punishment vary, but failure to comply with mandatory reporting is
usually punishable as a class B misdemeanor. This typically entails six months in
prison. I find this to be a reasonable minimum punishment, although arguments could
certainly be made for harsher penalties.

5. A refined mandatory reporting statute
By analyzing all these factors, we can define a “refined” mandatory reporting law
as one that 1) requires all adults to report; 2) protects all individuals, regardless of age
or disability; 3) requires immediate reporting; 4) punishes failure to report as a
misdemeanor requiring at least 6 months in prison. The phrase “we’re all mandatory
reporters” captures the spirit of these proposed changes. It is no different from the oftrepeated sentiment in torts that we all have a duty to act reasonably to each other,
regardless of our differences or conflicts. Survivors deserve no less from a modern,
civilized society.

B. Inadequacy of Other Options
Aside from mandatory reporting, there are many other types of laws which come
close to criminalizing enabling behavior yet fall short in one way or another. The
purpose in reviewing these forms of legislation is twofold. First, it demonstrates how
currently existing legislation, in a way, embraces the idea of criminalizing omission and
holding individuals responsible for harms they did not instigate. Second, it demonstrates
how criminalization of enablers may simply require a different interpretation of current
legislation as opposed to a new law.
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1. Criminal negligence
Criminal negligence is described as “a material forsaking of expected concern,
vital abandonment of required care, or real divergence of appropriate concern,” as well
as “aggravated, culpable, gross, or reckless conduct that is such a departure from that
of the ordinarily prudent or careful person . . . as to be incompatible with a proper regard
for human life.” It is important to note that “criminal negligence” may refer either to an
independent crime or to the mens rea element of the model penal code.
On the surface, this seems to align perfectly with my core argument: criminalize
the enablers because their conduct—their omissions—represent a substantial and
unjustifiable deviance from the ordinary standard of care each human being owes to
each other. Moreover, the crime of negligence is tied to the tort of negligence, which
clearly enumerates a general duty of care which all human beings owe each other.
Despite this seemingly good fit, most states interpret their criminal negligence
statutes only in terms of commission, especially as related to homicide. In jurisdictions
where broad criminal negligence statutes exist, it may be more advisable to expand
interpretation of those statues to encompass enabling behavior rather than creating a
separate statute.

2. Reckless endangerment
In basic terms, reckless endangerment entails causing another to be put in
circumstances which may result in death or serious injury. For example, the Utah
reckless endangerment statute reads, “a person commits reckless endangerment if,
under circumstances not amounting to a felony offense, the person recklessly engages
in conduct that creates a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another
person.” There also exists child endangerment statutes which criminalizes such
behavior more severely when harm results to a child, although many of these statutes
restrict liability to the parent or guardian of said child.
There is an argument that enabling behavior constitutes reckless endangerment.
According to the Model Penal Code, one acts recklessly when one “consciously
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will
result from his conduct.” It is an easy argument that the behaviors exhibited by many
enablers easily falls within this definition.
Yet American courts have interpreted reckless endangerment in terms of
commission, not omission. As such, most reckless endangerment statutes envision
more overtly malicious acts; for example, deliberately leaving someone alone in a
desert and driving away.

3. Accessory after the fact
Many jurisdictions criminalize accessories “after the fact.” In general terms, this
means aiding or otherwise assisting one who has committed a crime, especially when
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helping them to avoid punishment. For example, the U.S. code criminalizes an
individual who “receives, relieves, comforts or assists the offender in order to hinder or
prevent his apprehension, trial or punishment, is an accessory after the fact.” On the
surface, this seems to describe enablers who could be said to have assisted those
guilty of sexual abuse. Yet again, in application courts have restricted interpretation to
actions which involve more overt, physical actions, avoiding any application to crimes of
omission.
There is clearly an underlying common thread: the failure to recognize the crime
of omission. While new statutes could—and perhaps should—be made, some may find
it more prudent to expand the reach of already existing legislation like these crimes so
as to encompass omission. Either way, changes must be made in order to fully and
effectively criminalize the enabler.

C. Australia-Specific Statutes
I do not pretend to be an expert in Australian law. But over the past several
weeks, and with the competent help of several friends, I have come to an understanding
of some Victorian law addressing this topic. I will refrain from specific legislative
recommendations. Rather, I provide general criticisms and suggestions which I would
invite this commission to consider when analyzing the effectiveness of these laws.
I found three existing provisions in Victorian law which could be effective in
criminalizing the enabler. The first is mandatory reporting. As expansive and helpful as
they are, I would posit the same criticisms against them as I did the American
mandatory reporting laws outlined above.
The second is criminal negligence. In Victoria, this is understood to mean that, “a
person who by negligently doing or omitting to do an act causes serious injury to
another person.”3 As with its American counterparts, the plain language of this statute
seems to encompass the idea of punishing the enablers listed above. However, in
practice the statute is rarely interpreted as such. Criminalizing the enabler with this
statute would likely require some clarification by way of amendment or policies adopted
by a prosecuting agency.
The third and most intriguing is a new and unique law which has been adopted in
some Australian states, in part as a reaction to the Royal Commission into Institutional
Responses to Child Sexual Abuse. In Victoria, this was codified as s327 of the Crimes
Act 1958.4 The statute has been in effect since 2014.
Put simply, this legislation criminalizes anyone who fails to report to the police
when they know that a child under the age of 16 is suffering sexual abuse. Critically, this
statute specifically states that protecting the interests, legal or otherwise, of an
institution is not a valid excuse. The statute provides immunity to anyone who

3
4

Crimes Act 1958, (Vic) s.24 (Austl.).
Crimes Act 1958, (Vic) s.327 (Austl.).
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reasonably fears that making a report would bring harm to any person, including
themselves.
For what it does and who it protects, section 327 does many things right, and
rectifies many of the criticisms of mandatory reporting listed above. For one, it extends
liability to all adults. This greatly expands the number of people who will be required to
provide assistance as opposed to limiting that number to a select few professions.
Moreover, this statute is practically designed to attack institutional complicity by
explicitly stating that the interests of protecting the child come before the interests of the
institution. Finally, the statute keeps in mind situations in which a person may be
harmed by making a report by providing immunity to such individuals.
This statute is novel, important, and groundbreaking. If adopted in every country,
it could be the vehicle by which institutional complicity is punished and, by way of
deterrence, reduced to the point that it ceases to be the noxious plague it is today. The
following criticisms of this statute come by way of recommendations for refining some
aspects of it.
The first criticism comes by way of the age requirement. Reports on the
legislative history of this document suggest that there was some debate regarding the
age of who is protected.5 Some believed that anyone below the age of 18 should be
protected while others thought that all persons of any age should be protected. The
legislators ultimately concluded to restrict protection to children below the age of 16.
I would ask this Commission to seriously consider the reasons behind only
protecting individuals under the age of 16. Age is not the only factor which can make an
individual susceptible to sexual assault. Numerous other factors can create
circumstances which can reduce or remove an individual’s ability to protect themselves.
I would like to briefly relate the story of a survivor with whom I have worked
extensively. Jon Vaughn was a student-athlete at the University of Michigan (19881990) where he played on the University’s football team. During that time, Vaughn was
sexually assaulted-abused-raped over 40 times by Dr. Robert Anderson, the University
team doctor. Vaughn, and hundreds of other former University of Michigan studentathletes have filed lawsuits against the University, claiming senior officials knew of
Anderson’s criminal predatory conduct which stretched over 50 years, yet failed to take
action to protect them. It is estimated Anderson committed over 40,000 sexual assaults.
Vaughn was an adult when these assaults occurred. His silence on the matter—
and that of dozens of other survivors—stemmed not from his age, but his life situation
and desire to remain in the good graces of the athletic department which had given him
so many opportunities. Vaughn’s vulnerability to sexual assault did not suddenly
evaporate when he hit a certain age. His vulnerability came from racism and the intense
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Consultation Paper: Criminal Justice, Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual
Abuse, pg. 227-233. www.childabuseroyalcommission.gov.au/sites/default/files/filelist/Consultation%20Paper%20-%20Criminal%20justice.pdf.
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pressures of sports culture. I would implore this commission to remember survivors like
Vaughn in considering age restrictions in section 327.
The reports on legislative history also suggest that there was some debate
regarding sufficient knowledge of the reporter. The statute itself holds that the reporter
just needs “reasonable belief” in order for the statute to trigger. But the legislative
history suggests that lawmakers wanted this definition to be both objective and
subjective. They held that a reporter may gain the requisite knowledge via information
obtained by a third party, but that it still may be a defense that the reporter could not
actually understand that abuse was occurring.
This raises several difficult questions. While it may be reasonable to consider if
an individual has enough information to “connect the dots,” that begs the question of
whether someone may improperly raise such a defense to avoid liability. Ultimately, I
would recommend that “reasonable belief” either be given a more specific definition or
else be lowered to the more expansive standard of reasonable suspicion. Since my
focus is on the survivor and protecting the individual in peril, I would recommend an
objective standard and oppose the introduction of a subjective standard as doing so
creates a window through which many enablers may avoid responsibility.
The legislative history also explains that it was intended that this statute would
not require a report to be made if someone 16 or older confided in the reporter about
their abuse and specifically stated that they did not wish a report to be made. This
reflects a similar statute adopted in New South Wales.6 While a survivor’s autonomy
deserves respect, this provision raises some serious questions when the perpetrator is
still at large and still has the opportunity to perpetuate abuse. If the abuser is dead or
otherwise incapable of causing future harm, there is a stronger argument that the
survivor’s autonomy should be respected. But when they are still at large, the survivor’s
desire to keep things quiet must be weighed against the importance of continuing to
protect current and future victims.
I would posit that when put on the scales of justice, the responsibility to protect
current and future victims far outweighs the benefit of respecting a survivor’s autonomy.
In any other situation, I would agree that the survivor’s wishes should be honored, but
when children may be in peril, all else must be stopped and put aside. To that end, I
would recommend editing the statute so as to require a report to be made, regardless of
the age of the survivor, when victims may continue to be at risk at the hands of the
abuser.
This relates to my final textual criticism, being the ex post facto provision. The
first subsection of section 327 explains that a report may only be made if the abuse
occurred on or after the first of July 2017. I do not wish to stir controversy regarding ex
post facto laws generally, but I would once again ask you to consider the prudence of
this provision when the perpetrator is still at large. Example after example shows that an
abuser can perpetuate their reign of terror for decades. Four years pales in the face of
that time span. As the statute currently stands, an individual would not be required to
6
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report if abuse occurred in 2016, even if the abuser has the same access and
opportunity to abuse, and even if victims are still in peril. I would recommend this portion
of the statute be rewritten to include offenses occurring before 2017 if the abuser is still
in a position to cause future abuse.
Finally, there is the question of enforcement. As of 2020, less than 10 people
have been charged under this statute.7 This may be due to the fact that this is a newer
section of the code or because no clear violations have arisen yet. Regardless, I would
recommend that this commission do all in its power to see that prosecutors and the
police understand when, how, and why to enforce this statute. It is equally important
that the people of Victoria know this statute exists, otherwise the deterrence theory of
criminal justice will be of ill effect. It may be wise to create trainings or other appropriate
methods of education to ensure that all people know understand that their omissions
could land them in prison.
Ultimately, as it stands today, section 327 is a monumental first step in
criminalizing the enabler. With some refinements, it can serve as the standard for how
sexual assault enabling and institutional complicity can be fairly and aggressively
prosecuted in all countries.

D. Arguments and Counterarguments
It is only appropriate to examine this proposal with a critical eye. With that in
mind, below are listed some of the most common arguments against criminalizing
enablers and my response by way of counterargument.
Some argue this legislation is potentially harmful to those suffering from abuse.
For example, a wife being abused by her husband may be less likely to report instances
of her husband abusing others out of fear of retaliation in the form of more abuse. There
is a simple solution to this valid concern: provide immunity to those who are being
abused or who are in reasonable fear of abuse by the same abuser. This protection is
already a part of the aforementioned section 327 and should be a standard feature of
any attempt to enabler criminalization.
In that same vein, there are many, especially in employment situations, who may
fear retaliation from the hands of the institution for their actions in preventing abuse.
Here, again, a relatively simple solution is to expand and/or reinforce whistleblower
protections. While many such laws already exist, legislators ought to ensure they work
effectively and ensure that the public knows they are in place. Institutions themselves
also ought to create internal policies to ensure their own protections for whistleblowers.
Some argue such legislation will result in discriminatory prosecution practices
against minorities. This is indeed a valid and ongoing concern which needs to be
addressed on multiple fronts. Prosecution review boards, along with other efforts, can
be effective at counteracting this concern.

7
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Many express concerns that enabler statues such as these will cause people to
become paranoid. The counterargument is that the mens rea requirement for
knowledge of sexual assault can be defined in a sufficiently distinct way so as to restrict
punishment to instances where abuse is reasonably likely to be occurring.
An additional concern is that this legislation will punish people who fail to report
not out of a desire to protect their institution, but simply because they are timid. From
the survivor’s perspective, there is no discomfort which the enabler could possibly
experience which could compare to the years of anxiety, fear, nightmares, stress, and
often unending pain which can follow even one instance of sexual abuse, let alone
hundreds. Failing to enact legislation criminalizing the enabler ensures perpetrators
continue to act with immunity and confidence. The continued insistence that
criminalizing omission is “one step too far” ensures abandonment of the survivor. Failing
to criminalize omission reflects a willingness, intended or otherwise, to protect the
enabler rather than to protect individuals from sexual abuse. Such a conclusion is
unacceptable. When put on the proverbial scales of justice, the needs of the victim far
outweigh concerns of the enabler.
The persistently repeated argument that such efforts are unnecessary since
people will usually do the right thing is debunked in example after example. While often
held up as the primary reason to oppose criminalizing enabler omission, it reflects
abandonment of the person in peril. More than that, the failure to criminalize omission
represents an unwillingness to recognize that omission causes harm. To argue that
omission is devoid of ramifications is to ignore the plight of the person directly harmed
by a powerful combination of the perpetrator and enabler. The melding of commission
and omission has one result: terrible harm to the person in peril who was attacked by
the perpetrator and abandoned by the enabler.

VI. A PATH FORWARD
My testimony proposes a way forward to break down a wall constructed over
centuries and reinforced on a regular basis that protects perpetrators. It does not
require Superman to break it. However, from the perspective of the person in peril, it
must truly seem that the wall which protects those seeking to harm them—directly and
indirectly—has become impenetrable. That is most unfortunate, reflecting a deeply
ingrained opposition to recognizing that the crime of omission is as consequential as the
crime of commission. The consistent voices of opposition to criminalizing the omission
of bystanders and enablers reflect an unwillingness to examine the dilemma from the
perspective of the person most in need of assistance. This resistance only serves to
reinforce the entrenched power of abusers, their institutions, and their enablers.
The power dynamic between institutions and their protectors, and the person in
peril is illustrative of an overwhelming power imbalance. If there is something we ought
to have collectively learned by now, it is that power imbalances cause extraordinary
harm, whether directly or indirectly. Power imbalances cut across many sectors; they
cannot be claimed by one group.
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Our failure to legislate the crime of omission ensures continuing harm to those
who do not have a voice, impacted by a power imbalance that favors the institutions and
ensures that society continues to turn its back on them. The time has come for
responsibility to be taken. In the preceding pages, we have provided a road map for
how to overcome this historical wrong; the time to act is now before what happened at
Michigan State, Penn State, USA Gymnastics, LSU, the University of Michigan, and the
Catholic Church is perceived as normal.
Survivors deserve better from society.
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